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SEARCH FOR PARITY: 
ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE QUESTION OF TRIESTE 
Osvaldo Croci 
This article examines the attitudes of Italian and Yugoslav decision-makers towards the 
question of Trieste during the so-called "dynamic" phase of the conflict (1951-54), Foreign 
policy decision-makers, like other people, act on the basis of their own subjective percep-
tions of reality. Making a decision means choosing one course of action from a range of 
perceived alternatives, While the operational environment, both international and domes-
tic, delimits the setting within which decision-makers must act, the psychological environ-
ment defines the field of choice and the ordering of alternatives in it from which they will 
select their preferred options, For analytic purposes, the psychological environment can 
be seen as comprising two inextricably linked elements: an attitudinal prism and specific 
images. The attitudinal prism can be defined as the lens through which decision-makers 
perceive the operational environment. The content of these perceptions can instead be 
defined as images. A dynamic relationship exists between psychological and operational 
environments insofar as the former generally orients decision-makers towards the latter and 
predisposes them to act in a particular way, while changes in the operational environment 
resulting from the actions of the decision-makers will, in tum, affect the psychological one. 
This relationship tends to be self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting. If one assumes, 
for instance, that Italian decision-makers have negative images of Yugoslav ones and vice 
versa, then, according to this model, they will tend to make decisions whose impact on 
the operational environment will result in changes that will lead them to form even more 
negative images of the adversary, and so on in a self-reinforcing spiraL This spiral can be 
reversed only when some event in the operational environment, brought about by a third 
actor, changes the psychological environment of both sets of decision-makers, Besides 
being based on social, cultural and individual factors, the attitudinal prism is also shaped 
by past experiences, A brief review of the major events in the Trieste saga between 1944 
and 1951 will show the origins of the major components of the prism for both sets of 
decision-makers, 1 
The perceptions of the operational environment of Italian and Yugoslav decision-makers 
in 1944 were radically different. Following the armistice of September 8, 1943 , southern 
Italy passed under the rule of the Allied Military Government [AMG], while the rest of 
the country came under the effective control of German forces, The situation in the Julian 
region immediately became a matter of concern for the Italian government. The problem 
was not so much the presence of Nazi forces there as the fact that they might soon be driven 
out by Yugoslav partisans which could mean the loss of that region for Italy. Under existing 
conditions, however, the only way Italian decision-makers could react to the perceived 
Yugoslav threat was to pressure the Allies to act on their behalf. Two types of arguments 
were used in this endeavor. The first was strictly legalistic: the Allies were bound to 
establish AMG in the entire region by the terms of the armistice and the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter, which called for territorial questions to arrive unprejudiced at the peace 
conference. Italy had a right to the region based on the Rapallo border treaty, "freely 
negotiated" by the Italian and Yugoslav governments in 1920, and therefore expected to 
retain its 1939 borders. The possibility of border rectifications was not ruled out. Any 
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change, howe,v,er, was to have the "Italian Royal Government's freely expressed assent." 
The second was exhortative and appealed to a supposed identity of interests between Italy 
and the Allies. Given the emotive significance the Julian region had for all Italians, failure 
to retain it could produce a pernicious resurgence of nationalist feelings and would result 
in a loss of prestige for the Allies. These, therefore, had an interest in defending the Julian 
cause given the strategic significance of Italy's position in the Mediterranean and in 
Europe. 2 
The Yugoslavs, for their part, followed a Realpolitik approach. They saw in the situation 
an opportunity to reverse the injustice suffered at the end of World War r. They considered 
that Italy was able to prevail at Versailles and impose a "Diktat" at Rapallo because its army 
controlled the area under dispute. Hence, they decided that the best way to insure their 
claim to the region was to occupy it militarily. As Vladimir Velebit (then Chief of the 
Yugoslav military mission in London) would later recall: 
"We thought ... that whoever is in possession of a certain territory has a 
ninety-nine percent chance of keeping it. . .. For this reason we made our 
preparations to concentrate our troops for the final quick advance against the 
Germans in a north-western direction, in order to be in Austria and Trieste before 
the British and American troops. ,,3 
Although the race for Trieste ended in a tie , the Yugoslav army won the race for Istria. 
With his troops in control of the region, Tito openly called into question the Allies' 
objective of setting up their own AMG. Although he was ready to cooperate militarily, he 
considered, as he told Field Marshal Alexander, that since "his troops had liberated [a] 
territory which [was] Slovenian ... they had a right to occupy it as an allied army on account 
of their services and sacrifices in the allied cause."4 The Allied military was reluctant to 
risk an armed confrontation with Tito for the attainment of an objective it did not consider 
essential for the continuation of war operations. The State Department, however, believed 
that Tito's advances had to be rebuffed in order to signal the Soviet government that the 
Allies would not tolerate its attempt to "operate through its satellite Yugoslavia in the 
Mediterranean theater to set up whatever states and boundaries look[ed] best for the future 
power of the U.S.S .R." This did not necessarily require, however, continued and complete 
adherence to the original policy of extending AMG to all Italian territory within its 1939 
frontiers. Thus, in deference also to the views of the military , it was decided that the Allies 
would not seek the complete evacuation of the region by Yugoslav forces but would pursue 
instead the more limited objective of obtaining "complete and exclusive control of Trieste 
and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Monfa1cone, and an area 
sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control." Since Stalin 
had no intention of challenging the Anglo-Americans on a question of marginal interest 
to him, Tito reluctantly had to withdraw his forces beyond the demarcation line (later 
known as the "Morgan line") requested by the Anglo-Americans. 5 
This compromise did not satisfy either of the two contenders. The Yugoslavs, who 
thought that "as a belligerent [their country had] all the rights to hold the area till the final 
decision at the peace conference [was] taken ," regarded the Allied request to evacuate 
Trieste as an "ultimatum". Yugoslavia, Tito complained, "was evidently [considered] a 
third class ally which did not enjoy the same rights as other classes of allies." He also 
resented the lack of Soviet support. The lesson he drew from this episode was succinctly 
presented in a speech in Ljubljana on May 27: 
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,"We demand that everyone shall be master in his own house, we do not want 
to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; 
we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest."6 
The Italians, for their part, felt betrayed. The Yugoslav "armed conquest," they later 
charged, had been possible only because of "the carelessness of the Western Allied military 
command, its unpardonable mistakes and suspicious blindness." The demarcation line 
made a mockery of Allied promises to establish AMG in the whole region , especially since 
"with a bit more firmness, the Anglo-Americans could have obtained a more favorable 
line. ,,7 
After June 1945 the politics of the Cold War provided the framework in which almost 
every problem came to be viewed and decided by the major powers. The United States and 
the Soviet Union backed the claims of Italy and Yugoslavia, respectively. For both, 
however, the Julian problem was , in the words of Alberico Casardi, one of the Italian 
delegates to the Council of Foreign Ministers, but "a completely secondary, and almost 
incidental , aspect of an infinitely greater political game." Thus, when French Foreign 
Minister Georges Bidault suggested as a compromise solution that the city of Trieste and 
its adjacent area be turned into a Free Territory (later known as the FTT) under the auspices 
of the United Nations, the Anglo-Americans accepted the idea because they feared a 
Soviet-Yugoslav coup de main if the question was not solved soon. The Soviets, for their 
part, without consulting with the Yugoslavs, traded their acceptance of the proposal against 
Anglo-American agreement to their request for reparations from Italy. 8 
Both Italy and Yugoslavia resented this decision. The Italians felt that the attitude of the 
Allies, and the Americans in particular, although benevolent towards them, had not been 
pugnacious enough towards the others. As Ambassador Pietro Quaroni reported during the 
deliberations: 
"American support is not worth a plugged nickel when faced with Russian 
opposition .... A way from the conference ... they are lions ... at the conference 
table the end result of the negotiations is that they give up everything." 
The Yugoslavs, for their part, took notice that the Soviet Union had again let them down, 
using the question of Trieste, as Edvard Kardelj would later recall, "as a bargaining point 
in the mutual transactions between the Great Powers, thus inflicting serious blows to 
[Yugoslav] interests in a most difficult moment. ,,9 
The UN Security Council was unable to reach agreement on the appointment of a 
governor for the FTT which, consequently , was never set up. The city of Trieste and the 
north-western part of the FTT (known as Zone A) continued to be administered by the 
Anglo-American military government, while its south-eastern part, beyond the Morgan 
line (Zone B), remained under the control of a Yugoslav military administration. 
The period between 1947 and 1951 has been referred to as the "static phase" of the 
Trieste problem. Two significant events, however, occurred in this period: the so-called 
"tripartite declaration" and the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. Upon Italian solicitations , on March 
20, 1948 , the French, British and American governments released a proposal which 
suggested that since the FTT could not be set up, the entire territory should be returned 
to Italy. Although apparently requested only for electoral purposes, once it was issued, 
Italian decision-makers chose to look at the declaration as a promissory note in its own 
right. They were aware that, since it could not be forced upon Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, the proposal had, at best, "only a symbolic value." Yet, to keep Allied attention 
focused on the problem, they insisted on having it periodically reconfirmed. 10 
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To the Yugoslavs the tripartite declaration came as a blow to their national pride. A 
proposal for a revision of the peace treaty with Italy should have been officially commu-
nicated also to the other treaty signatories-especially to Yugoslavia, which as administra-
tor of Zone B had a primary and direct interest in the question. The Allies, instead, sent 
an official note in this sense only to the Soviet Union and Italy. Yugoslav officials 
complained not aboutthe substance of the proposal, which they dismissed as a propagan-
distic electoral ploy , but about the procedure followed by the Allies, which they regarded 
as "needlessly offensive to Yugoslavia." 11 
Three months after the declaration , Yugoslavia's rift with the Soviet Union changed the 
operational environment of all actors involved. After an initial period of caution, the 
Americans decided to provide economic assistance to Tito 's regime in the hope of keeping 
it permanently alienated from the Soviet camp. As a consequence, while still publicly 
supporting the tripartite proposal, their objective became that of reaching "a lasting 
political settlement ... by mutual agreement among the parties directly concerned." At 
about the same time, the Yugoslavs expressed their readiness to negotiate some form of 
partition with Italy. They requested, however, that the Allies first make it clear that they 
no longer supported the tripartite declaration, otherwise the Italians would not "budge from 
claiming return of the entire Free Territory to Italy." At first the Americans were hesitant 
to take such a step lest it fan anti-Western sentiments in Italy. This attitude, however, 
changed in mid-1951, when they decided to extend military assistance to Tito, their 
ultimate objective being to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western defence system. One 
could not expect, in fact , the Italians and the Yugoslavs to cooperate militarily as long as 
the FTT problem continued to stand in between them. 12 
By this time the attitudes of all major actors towards the FTT problem were well 
established. Hence, they can now be examined in more detail. As concerns Italian deci-
sion-makers, two components of their attitudinal prism are of particular relevance. The 
first, which could be defined as the "domestic magnifier," relates to their tendency to 
regard foreign policy choices as geared to, and shaped by, domestic political consider-
ations. This does not refer to the constraints that domestic politics inevitably impose upon 
foreign policy but describes a rather extreme situation where the main functions of foreign 
policy are domestic, that is where foreign policy issues are essentially symbolic and always 
approached with the aim of consolidating the hegemony of the dominant political forces. 
The Italian decision to seek admission to NATO, for instance , was not so much prompted 
by considerations of external military security as by the desire to relegate the Communist 
opposition to a permanent marginal position within the domestic political system (or, as 
Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi put it, "to make the efforts of the internal revolutionaries 
vain"), and thus insure the ruling coalition against any radical shift in power. 13 
The second element of the prism was the "leverage syndrome." This describes the 
propensity of Italian decision-makers to regard membership in international organizations 
primarily as a means for Italy to regain its "proper status" in the international community, 
extract some concessions from its partners and be backed up by them in questions of 
national interest. Quaroni, for instance, advised Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza to seek 
admission to the Western European Union [WEU] because he thought it would be "the 
fastest and most effective way for Italy to regain parity in the international community." 
Sforza saw entrance into NATO as assuring the end of "any political and moral difference" 
between Italy and other Western countries. The Ambassador in Washington Alberto 
Tarchiani regarded it as a means for Italy "to reach the first and fundamental objective of 
its postwar foreign policy: to become an equal and dignified partner in the Western political 
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system." During the negotiations for both the WEU and NATO, De Gasperi hinted that 
the Italian government would find it easier to join a military pact if membership brought 
with it revision of the peace treaty - particularly those clauses concerning the colonies and 
Trieste-which kept Italy in a position of inferiority relative to the other members. 
Although admission to NATO and various other international organizations did not auto-
matically produce the desired revisions, De Gasperi was confident that these would not be 
too late in coming. Thus , at the beginning of 1949, on the occasion of Italy's joining the 
Council of Europe, he could affirm: 
"Finally ... we emerge from the peculiar situation in which we have been since 
the war and like others, reenter the European family of nations in which ... we 
will be able to say a word on those postwar questions which have not yet been 
solved." 
Trieste obviously figured most prominently among these unsolved questions. 14 
Italian decision-makers, moreover, presented as a fact the view that "by entering into 
the Atlantic pact [they] had reinforced the ties of solidarity and cooperation with the 
Western democratic nations, thus further committing them to help Italy with the FTT." 
They felt, therefore, that failure on the part of the Allies to act decisively in Italy's favour 
betrayed the expectations of Italian public opinion and risked turning it against the West. 
The two components of the prism thus converged to form a single strong conviction: Italy 
was not simply entitled to the support of the Allies but it was also of paramount importance 
for the Allies to provide it. De Gasperi expressed this very well when , commenting on the 
prospects of the European Defence Community (EDC) during an official visit to Washing-
ton in September 1951, he tirelessly repeated that "without a satisfactory settlement of the 
Trieste question no democratic government in Italy could get parliamentary support for a 
joint defense effort." If the Italians should think that "their allies could not save Trieste 
for Italy, the result would be a dangerous trend toward neutralism" and "his coalition would 
lose votes to the left and right. "15 
These two components of the attitudinal prism define the outer parameters of Italian 
action toward the FIT problem. The "leverage syndrome" points to pressure on the Allies 
as the most preferred means for Italian decision-makers to seek a solution. The "domestic 
magnifier," on the other hand, suggests that they would evaluate different solutions in 
terms of their impact on domestic politics and that variations in the intensity and scope of 
their pressures on the Allies would be related to changes in the domestic political scene. 
The central component of the attitudinal prism of Yugoslav decision-makers can be 
described as the "equality imperative." The Yugoslav attitude had been deeply influenced 
by the Great Powers ' practice of unilaterally deciding matters of concern to smaller 
countries. As long as they were aligned with one side, they had to swallow such a pill. 
Having defected from the Soviet camp, primarily because of their unwillingness to sacri-
fice national interests to Soviet ones, they were no longer prepared to put up with such 
practices. Since the FTT was an Italian-Yugoslav border dispute , they thought that a 
solution should emerge out of direct negotiations between the two countries most directly 
concerned. This attitude was best captured by American Charge in Belgrade Woodruff 
Wallner, in a report in which he warned the State Department against the temptation of 
implementing the tripartite declaration with respect to Zone A without consultation with 
the Yugoslavs: 
"The Yugoslavs cannot or will not accept concessions on [a] national problem 
like Trieste imposed from abroad at a time when they are drawing closer to [the] 
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West. This would be contrary [to the] ultranationalistic tendencies [of] this 
young nation as a whole and within [the] regime would be resented by doctrinaire 
commies as paying too great [a] national price to enter [the] bourgeois club. 
Consequently, they require that the Yugo[slav]-Ital[ian] settlement appear as [a] 
freely negotiated understanding between two sovereign nations with concessions 
being freely consented [to] in [the] interests [of] collective security against [the] 
Soviet threat and not imposed on them by [the] West." 
The "equality imperative" suggests that the Yugoslavs, although prepared to make 
concessions to attain a solution, would resist any decision affecting the future of the FfT, 
made without their participation. And indeed they never tired of repeating that Yugoslavia 
would "never agree to have the Trieste question settled without its participation" and that 
Italy would do better to "pay more heed to geography" and look for an "Adriatic" solution 
rather than for an "Atlantic" one because "pressure on Yugoslavia [would] elicit only one 
reply: unwavering resistance. ,,16 
Given the instrumental view Italian decision-makers had of the Atlantic Alliance, they 
did not attach as much strategic importance as the Americans did to a Western opening to 
Yugoslavia. De Gasperi, in particular, regarded it primarily as a threat to Italy's claims 
to the FfT. Whereas the Americans now looked at this question as an irritant between two 
countries which shared a common interest in defence and should therefore make an effort 
to compromise, the Italians looked at it exclusively as a territorial dispute having potential-
ly explosive repercussions on domestic politics, and hence as a zero sum game. If 
Yugoslavia became a member of the Western club , the solution could only be a compro-
mise and Italy "would not succeed in obtaining Zone B , or part of it, and could even be 
obliged to discuss questions concerning Zone A." Italian decision-makers measured the 
benefits of belonging to the club in terms of the advantages individual members could 
derive from it. The club, as they saw it, was supposed to protect and advance the welfare 
of its members and be of assistance in their disputes with nonmembers. As the Ambassador 
in London Manlio Brosio later put it: 
"We were NATO allies ... we believed we were entitled to preferential 
considerations over Yugoslavia ... We felt that we deserved the support of the 
U.S. and the U.K. because of a community of ideology, of systems, and of the 
alliance. " 
If a non-member locked in a dispute with a member was seeking help from the club, 
what would be more natural than asking for something in return? Tito , they thought , should 
very simply be told that if he· wanted aid he would have to show "a sincere willingness to 
cooperate with the Western world and Italy in particular." This obviously meant yielding 
to Italian requests on the question of the FfT. As long as Tito failed to provide this 
"decisive proof," it was also legitimate to doubt his solidarity with the Western democra-
cies. Rather than pressing Italy to negotiate, the U.S. should try to extract from Tito a 
solution favorable to Italy because "only Washington [had] the means of persuasion," i.e., 
was in the unique position of being able to force Tito to make concessions on the FfT as 
a condition for granting him aid. Consequently, Italian decision-makers refused to enter 
into direct negotiations with Yugoslavia and preferred to remain anchored to the empty, 
but politically valuable, promise of the tripartite declaration. The Allies were to be 
"nailed," as De Gasperi put it , "to their moral engagement" and not to be allowed to give 
it a posthumous interpretation in the sense that they "would simply have adhered to a 
compromise solution to be agreed upon with the Slavs."I7 
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The American decision to explore the possibility of integrating Yugoslavia into the 
Western defence system led, however, some Italian diplomats to question this dilatory 
policy. In July 1951, the ambassadors in the Allied capitals began to argue insistently in 
their reports to Rome that it was illusory for Italy to continue to look to the U.S. for a 
solution. Yugoslavia could offer more divisions than Italy, which was the only thing of 
interest to the Americans. They thought that "any postponement of a courageous decision 
for reasons of domestic politics" would, in the long run, work against Italy. Hence, the 
time had come to abandon "the game of requesting a confirmation of the tripartite 
declaration every three or four months," and fall back "on a less intransigent position." The 
Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Vittorio Zoppi , presented De Gasperi with two 
possible courses of actions. The first was to negotiate with the Yugoslavs a definitive 
solution which would give Italy full sovereignty over Zone A and "as much of Zone B as 
could be tom away from Tito." The second was to convince the Allies to tum over to Italy 
the administration of Zone A. The "provisional solution," as this option came to be called, 
was perceived as an intermediate step capable of achieving two objectives: first, it would 
put Italy on a level of "parity" with Yugoslavia, and thus increase its bargaining position, 
in case a definitive solution would indeed have to be reached through direct negotiations; 
second, it would deprive the Allies of an instrument of pressure. Zoppi feared, in fact , that 
while reluctant to exert any pressure on Tito to obtain an acceptable compromise in Zone 
B, the Allies would not hesitate, if need be, "to force our hand." De Gasperi rejected both 
alternatives. Direct negotiations, he thought , would not yield acceptable results as long as 
the Allies continued to curry favour with Tito. As for the "provisional solution," he feared 
it could be interpreted as a relinquishment of the Italian claims to Zone B and hurt the center 
parties electorally. 18 
Allied pressures, however, eventually obliged him to agree to negotiations with the 
Yugoslavs. These (the Guidotti-Bebler talks of November 1951-March 1952) only exposed 
the profound differences in the working assumptions of the two contenders. The Yugoslavs 
worked under a Realpolitik assumption: they controlled Zone B while the Italians were, 
for all practical purposes, in control of Zone A through the Allies. Any solution, they felt, 
would have to take this reality into account. Hence, all their proposals were based, in one 
way or another, on the idea that concessions by the two countries in their respective zones 
would have to be more or less equal in importance. The Italians worked, instead, under 
what could be called the transcendental assumption: they felt, in the words of Tarchiani , 
that Italian "rights in Trieste had to triumph independently [emphasis added] of the 
circumstances which had caused the loss of that territory and population and of the 
objective conditions which had prevented regaining them." The peace treaty had already 
obliged Italy to leave Italian-populated cities to Yugoslavia. Hence a solution, to be 
acceptable, had at least to "redeem" those parts of Zone B that were predominantly Italian. 
They suggested a division of the FTT along what they termed "the continuous ethnic line." 
They regarded this solution as an acceptable compromise, since it made territorial conces-
sion to Yugoslavia in Zone B , in areas predominantly inhabited by Slovenes. To the 
Yugoslavs, however , these were not concessions at all, since these areas were already 
under Yugoslav control. Not surprisingly, the talks ended among reciprocal accusations 
of intransigence. 19 
In the spring of 1952, following riots in Trieste, the Italians requested the British and 
American governments to convene a conference in London "to examine jointly measures 
designed to foster a closer collaboration in Zone A among the three governments and with 
the local authorities there. " De Gasperi's objective was to regain effective administrative 
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control of the Zbne while final authority would continue to be formally vested in the Allied 
Zone Commander. This solution, he thought, would allow him to put an end to what he 
regarded as the deterioration of Italian interests there, without incurring the domestic risks 
involved in the "provisional solution." Although unable to convince the Allies to empty 
AMG of all powers, De Gasperi nevertheless succeeded in wresting from them substantial 
concessions. He then publicly presented the outcome of the conference as "a primary 
application of the tripartite declaration. ,,20 
The Yugoslavs were not officially informed of the London conference but learned about 
it from the press. To them, this was proof that the Allies still did not treat them on a par 
with Italy. The Allies tried to justify their behavior by pointing out that the objective of 
the conference was to associate the Italians with the administration of Zone A, not to make 
a final disposition of it. The Yugoslavs, however, felt that as legal co-administrators of 
the FIT they had a right to be at least consulted. Thus, they denounced the outcome of 
the conference as a "unilateral and illegal violation of the international status of Zone A 
and a serious blow to the[ir) rights and interests. ,,21 
All subsequent Allied attempts to convince the Italians to resume negotiations proved 
futile. Thus, in the fall of 1952, the British, anxious to withdraw from Trieste, suggested 
to the Americans that perhaps the only solution lay in imposing partition along the zonal 
boundary. Since a definitive partition was even worse than a "provisional" one, De Gasperi 
turned to the Americans. He argued that to help the center parties in the upcoming elections 
they should "act on Belgrade with sufficient energy to obtain for [Italy), and in the general 
interest, an acceptable compromise in Zone B." Between December 1952 and March 1953, 
the Americans came up with two different plans. If acceptable to Italy they would have 
then endeavored to obtain Yugoslav agreement. De Gasperi, however, rejected both of 
them. Since the divisions suggested did not come close to the "continuous ethnic line," he 
felt that acceptance would hurt him electorally and insisted on a more favorable line. When 
the plan was finally presented to the Yugoslavs, these turned it down without comment to 
its substance but lamenting that the Italians still continued to "expect a solution to come 
from the Great Powers ... by means of pressure on Yugoslavia." De Gasperi then con-
vinced the Americans to make another attempt, making it clear this time that "if, for 
political reasons, Tito desired that the agreement result from direct negotiations" he would 
agree to them on condition, however, that "the fundamental terms of the agreement be 
established and accepted by both parties beforehand through the good offices of the United 
States." The Yugoslavs this time replied that it would be "preferable" to conduct any 
"serious negotiations" after the Italian elections. 22 
The poor performance of the center parties in the June 1953 elections (they lost 12.7% 
of the votes and 42 seats with respect to 1948) convinced De Gasperi that time had come 
to seek the "provisional solution." He was, however, unable to reconstitute a centrist 
coalition and on August 24 he ceded his place to Giuseppe Pella who formed a center-right 
government. For the new Prime Minister the pursuit of the "provisional solution" became 
a high priority. On the one hand, the continued support of the right-wing parties depended 
in no small measure on his "determination to defend national interests." On the other, he 
felt that the reacquisition of Zone A, and of Trieste in particular, would be a political 
success capable of prolonging the life of its government, which was regarded as merely 
transitional. The Americans, however, were reluctant to turn Zone A over to Italy lest such 
a move increase, rather than decrease, friction between Italy and Yugoslavia, and all Italian 
verbal efforts to change their mind proved ineffective. 23 
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The situati'dn took a dramatic turn only a few days after Pella's arrival at the helm of 
the government. The August 29, 1953 Italian decision to move some troops toward the 
Yugoslav frontier was presented as a response to an alleged Yugopress story, released the 
previous day , which speculated on the possibility that Yugoslavia might annex Zone B, 
A closer look at available evidence reveals, however, that the decision to move troops was 
a calculated, risky initiative undertaken because of a perceived opportunity to sensitize the 
Allies to the necessity of implementing the "provisional solution," The threat perceived by 
Italian decision-makers was not that Yugoslavia might annex Zone B-a final outcome to 
which they had already resigned themselves when deciding to pursue the "provisional 
solution" -but that Italy might not recover Zone A in time, The American decision, 
announced in July , to hold talks on joint military planning with Yugoslavia, had led Italian 
decision-makers to conclude that time was now running out for Trieste, They feared that 
the progressive inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Western defence system, in conjunction with 
De Gasperi's political demise and the advent of Pella's transitional government, had 
increased Tito' s self-assurance and that he would now press for Trieste and its surroundings 
to be turned into an international neutral area on the model of Tangiers, Since repeated light 
nudges had produced no results in Washington, the idea slowly gained ground at the 
Foreign Ministry that recourse to other, more adequate, means to convince the Americans 
to hand over Zone A might be necessary, One had to show them, as Zoppi put it , that they 
worried too much about Yugoslav reactions if the "provisional solution" was implemented 
and too little about those in Italy if it were not. The decision to move troops, as Defence 
Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani concisely put it in his diary , had one simple objective: "to 
prove to Tito and above all to the Allies that we [did] not intend, on any account, to give 
up Trieste" [empasis added], A small concentration of troops along the frontier could not 
deter Tito from annexing Zone B , had this really been his intention, but would be effective 
in signalling Italian restlessness about the future of Zone A to the Americans and, 
hopefully, pushing them along a path they had been reluctant to follow until then, As 
Tarchiani put it in retrospect: "From that unfortunate series of incidents the Allies were 
almost forced to convince themselves that the problem of Trieste could take a tragic turn 
at any moment; hence , it was both necessary and urgent to solve it. ,,24 
Following the military measures of August 29, Italian decision-makers moved on two 
fronts, In a speech in Rome on September 13, Pella called for a plebiscite as a solution 
to the FIT problem, This, however, was merely a tactical move for public consumption, 
In the words of Tarchiani: "We did not believe the proposal of the plebiscite would go 
through but we hoped through a forceful action on our part to reach a solution; that is, that 
we could at least obtain the administration of Zone A," Behind the scene, in fact , Italian 
decision-makers confronted the Allies (and the Americans in particular) with a barrage of 
requests for the implementation of the "provisional solution," Their arguments relied on 
a combination of suasion and pressure: the Allies should put an end to "their so-called 
impartiality" since "impartiality shown towards a communist dictatorship and a democrat-
ic, full- participating member of NATO [could] only be interpreted,,, as partiality for Tito 
and support for Yugoslavia;" turning the administration of Zone A over to Italy was by now 
the only possible way to reach a settlement; once on an equal footing with Yugoslavia, in 
fact, Italy could look more confidently to the prospect of direct negotiations; the implemen-
tation of the "provisional solution" would satisfy Italian public opinion, strengthen Pella 's 
government, enable him to pursue a strong pro-Western course and thus allow him to solve 
all outstanding foreign policy issues (the ratification of the EDC treaty and the signing of 
an agreement for the concession of military facilities); continuation of the policy of 
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"impartiality,"' on the other hand, would embolden Tito's ambitions, solidify anti-Allied 
sentiments in Italy, strengthen extremist political forces, lead to the fall of Pella and even 
call into question Italy's membership in the Western alliance. 25 
Thanks primarily to the efforts of the ambassador in Rome Clare Boothe Luce, the State 
Department made, in early September, a dramatic U-turn in its policy towards the FfT. 
All of a sudden, the option of turning Zone A over to Italy, which until then had been 
regarded as more likely to complicate rather than solving the situation, came to be seen 
as capable of "reliev[ing the Allies] of their ... embarrassing responsibilities and commit-
ments" and even "pav[ing] the way ... for collaboration" between Italy and Yugoslavia. 
A plan to this effect was immediately drafted and presented to the British Foreign Office 
for concurrence. 26 
The Italians were immediately informed that a plan "to accomplish for Italy the 'equal-
ity' which Pella desir[ed] so strongly" was under study and would be unveiled soon. Being 
concerned that such a plan might involve more than the pure and simple "provisional" 
transfer of Zone A, Italian decision-makers proceeded to express their desiderata. This 
culminated on October 5, in the submission of a detailed outline. All Italian requests were 
forcefully backed up by Luce.27 The Yugoslavs were not officially informed of the plan 
but got an inkling of what was happening from press speculations. Mostly through public 
speeches and newspapers interviews, they signalled that the plan rumored to be in the 
making at the State Department was yet another example of the unilateral approach which 
had characterized Allied policy toward the FfT ever since the war and that , as such, it 
would be "unacceptable." As Tito put it in a speech in Split on September 12, Yugoslavia 
would not take lightly to anotherjait accompli and would "consider Italy's entry into Zone 
A as an act of aggression against which it would be compelled to take steps." At the same 
time, they continued to reiterate that a solution had to come out of direct negotiations or 
an international conference. 28 
Not surprisingly the Yugoslav reaction to the October 8 Allied decision to withdraw 
from Zone A and transfer its administration to Italy, was very strong. In a speech at 
Leskovac on October 10, Tito announced that military units had been sent to reinforce the 
troops already located in Zone B and that the moment an Italian soldier entered Zone A, 
the Yugoslavs would do the same. The Allied decision , the Yugoslavs argued, could not 
be accepted because it had been made in blatant disregard of Yugoslavia's special interest 
in the FIT as recognized also in the peace treaty with Italy. The entry of Italian troops in 
Zone A could also be considered-given Italy's traditional expansionist tendencies in the 
Balkans, the military measures of August 29 and recent revanchist statements by various 
Italian politicians-as the beginning of a policy of open aggression. Yugoslavia would 
therefore be justified, on the basis of art. 51 of the U. N. Charter, in resorting to force to 
protect its rights and national interests. 29 
Yugoslav decision-makers perceived that they needed, for domestic political reasons, 
to stand up to Western overbearing behavior as they had to that of the East. Their reaction, 
however, put them in a delicate situation. The Allied decision already risked fuelling 
Cominformist sympathies within the country especially since the Soviet Union cast itself 
in the role of unsolicited defender of Yugoslav interests by protesting Anglo-American 
behavior and bringing the FfT question to the U.N. Security Council. Even worse, were 
the Allies to decide to ignore the Yugoslav reaction and let the Italians into Zone A under 
the cover of their own troops, the domestic political consequences would be even more 
disastrous. Such a decision , as Kardelj told Eden and Tito repeated to the Allied diplomatic 
representatives in Belgrade, would be regarded by all Yugoslavs as yet another instance 
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of unfair pressure, if not outright imperialism, against their country, "cast a dark shadow" 
on the role of NATO and seriously jeopardize Yugoslavia's continued cooperation with the 
West. To avoid a dangerous confrontation Yugoslav decision-makers signalled to the 
Allies that they were not opposed to Zone A being returned to Italy, "provided it [was 1 done 
in a face-saving way." The method they suggested was the convening of a four-power 
conference (U.S., U.K., Italy and Yugoslavia).30 
Italian decision-makers, for their part, reacted to these developments with consternation. 
They warned the Allies that to yield to the Yugoslav threat would be "a new form of 
appeasement" and have serious repercussions in Italy. If the U. S. would not confront "a 
small bandit" such as Tito, its willingness to respond to a Soviet threat to Europe would 
also be questioned, NATO's credibility would be eroded, and Italy's continued participa-
tion in it endangered. They were willing to participate in a conference for the purpose of 
reaching a definitive agreement but only after the transfer of the administration of Zone 
A had been completed. 31 
The Allies now found themselves in an impasse. To proceed with the implementation 
of their plan was out of the question since it meant nullifying five years of efforts to 
cultivate relations with Yugoslavia and wrecking all defence plans for southeastern Eu-
rope. To renege on the October 8 decision was tantamount to admitting to a major policy 
mistake. A conference was not easy to organize since it was clear that neither country 
would agree to attend on the terms of the other. During the next couple of months, they 
tried, through ambiguous semantic gimmicks, to devise a conference proposal acceptable 
to both countries. All efforts proved vain. Although both countries softened their positions 
and came up with different suggestions, neither was prepared to give in on the central 
question of when the transfer of the administration was to begin. 32 
Finally, in early December the Allies decided to tackle the problem from a different 
angle. The new plan provided for the Allies to hold secret talks with the Yugoslavs to 
• 
explore with them, as co-administrators of the FIT, the terms of a definitive settlement 
which would take into consideration all aspects of the problem, including minority rights 
and the question of a free port in Trieste. Once an agreement had been reached, it would 
be submitted to the Italians. The Allies would then help mediate whichever differences 
might remain. This proposal was accepted by both countries. 33 
Yugoslav acceptance was not a surprise since the plan indirectly admitted the Allies' past 
errors and finally acknowledged Yugoslavia's "parity" of rights and interests in the FIT. 
Italian acceptance, on the other hand, was the result of some propitious circumstances. On 
December 23, while rejecting yet another Allied proposal for the convening of a confer-
ence, Pella had suggested an alternative plan which was rather similar to the one the Allies 
had already devised but not yet submitted to either country. They were thus able to submit 
their own plan to Pella as if it was his own, with some alterations. 34 Even more important, 
when the plan was submitted to Pella, he had already resigned as a result of factional 
squabbles within his own party. He could thus afford to disregard the domestic repercus-
sions of his choices on Trieste and accept the recommendation of his diplomatic advisors. 
These had also looked favorably to the idea of a conference. They were convinced, in fact, 
that the Yugoslavs had no interest in seeking a solution because as long as the Trieste 
question remained unsolved they could continue to benefit from American aid without 
having to engage themselves fully in the Western camp. A conference would make this 
clear also to the Americans and thus finally oblige them, as Tarchiani put it, "to confront 
a problem which for too long they had tried to elude with all kinds of expedients" namely, 
to choose between Italy and Yugoslavia. While his political future was still at stake, 
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however, Pella did not feel he could make any compromise. 35 
The rest of the story is well known. The secret negotiations which took place in London 
between February and October 1954 yielded an agreement which, at least as far as its 
territorial aspect was concerned, was little different from the one suggested in the October 
8 plan. This time, however, it had been reached with the participation of all actors 
involved. In commenting on this outcome, John C. Campbell has noted that the lesson to 
retain is that "the technique ... [of] the two-stage negotiation by the third party with first 
one side, then the other ... seem[s] especially suited to disputes between states that [are] 
unable or unwilling to negotiate directly with each other." What he forgets to add, 
however, is that the third party must be able to act as an impartial mediator and treat both 
contenders on a level of true "parity." Only then will it be able to catalyze a solution. This, 
in turn, might reverse, as it did in the case of Italy and Yugoslavia, the negative spiral of 
images and behavior and start the two contenders on a new path of cooperation. 36 
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POVZETEK 
ISKANJE PARITETNIH POZICIJ: 
ITALIJANSKE IN JUGOSLOVANSKE DRZE PRI RESEVANJU 
v v v 
TRAZASKEGA VPRASANJA 
Clanek obravnava drie in nagibe odlocujocih predstavnikov italijanske in jugoslovanske 
vlade - diplomatov in predvsem politikov - v dolgotrajnih pogajanjih za rditev triaskega 
vprasanja. Avtorjeva analiza se dotika pet obdobij teh pogajanj: zacetne faze , 1944-45, 
v kateri so bile postavljene prve zahteve po triaskem ozemlju; druge faze, 1945-49, ki je 
vodila do ustanovitve podroCij "A" in "B" Triaskega ozemlja; tretje, tako imenovane 
"staticne" faze, 1949-51, v kateri je prislo do tripartitne deklaracije in do sovjetsko-
jugoslovanskega preloma; in tako imenovane "dinamicne" faze rdevanja triaskega 
vprasanja, 1951-54, v kateri so pogajanja dosegla svoj visek in koncno razresitev. NajveC 
pozornosti avtor posveCa tej poslednji fazi, zlasti motivom in pricakovanjem treh glavnih 
protagonistov tega obdobja: de Gasperija, Pelleja in Tita. Za vsako teh stirih obdobij avtor 
analizira diplomatske in politicne pozicije obeh strani v mejah mednarodne politike skozi 
"prizmo dri in nagibov", odgovornih za formulacijo pozicij v mednarodnih pogajanjih 
jugoslovanske in italijanske strani pri resevanju triaskega vprasanja, 
